Product and Pricing Decisions in Crowdfunding
研究了众筹机制下创作者如何最优地设计产品线和定价，发现当买家对产品估值差异大时，提供多质量等级的产品线比单一产品更优，且质量差距更小；还分析了众筹对动态定价的影响。
This paper studies the optimal product and pricing decisions in a crowdfunding mechanism by which a project between a creator and many buyers will be realized only if the total funds committed by the buyers reach a specified goal. When the buyers are sufficiently heterogeneous in their product valuations, the creator should offer a line of products with different levels of product quality. Compared to the traditional situation where orders are placed and fulfilled individually, with the crowdfunding mechanism, a product line is more likely than a single product to be optimal and the quality gap between products is smaller. This paper also shows the effect of the crowdfunding mechanism on pricing dynamics over time. Together, these results underscore the substantial influence of the emerging crowdfunding mechanisms on common marketing decisions.