Revealing Future Prospects without Forecasts: The Case of Accelerating Material Contract Filings
研究了加速提交重大合同作为一种不涉及预测的未来相关披露机制，发现企业在前瞻性披露缺乏可信度或引发诉讼担忧时更可能加速提交，但面临现有竞争者高（低）产品市场竞争时因专有成本考虑而延迟提交，且加速提交与较低信息不对称相关。
ABSTRACT: Extant research on voluntary disclosure about future prospects has focused on two forward-looking disclosure mechanisms: management forecasts and conference calls. This study examines the accelerated filing of material contracts as another type of future-related disclosure that involves no forecasting. I find that firms are more likely to accelerate material contract filings when forward-looking disclosures could lack credibility or arouse litigation concerns. However, for proprietary cost considerations, firms delay contract filings when facing high (low) product market competition from incumbents (potential entrants). I also find that accelerated contract filing is incrementally associated with lower information asymmetry. Overall, while presenting a cost-benefit trade-off that is distinctly different from forward-looking disclosures, accelerated contract filing is an important alternative channel through which firms communicate future prospects to investors. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the public sources identified in the paper. Contact the author for any specific data requests.