Endogenous cases and the evolution of the common law
构建了一个法官造法的动态模型，其中理想法律规则未知但可学习，法院先前判决影响后续案件流，模型解释了法院何时撰写宽泛或狭窄意见以及普通法的长期性质，法律会内生稳定但存在剩余不确定性和模糊性。
Abstract I develop a dynamic model of judge‐made law in which the ideal legal rule is unknown but can be learned. In contrast to existing articles, the flow of cases heard by the court is affected by the court's prior decisions. The model highlights the significance of this feedback in explaining when and why the court will write broader or narrower opinions, and the long‐run properties of common law. In equilibrium, the law settles endogenously, because the incentives to make legally controversial choices disappear as the law evolves. Settled law exhibits residual uncertainty and ambiguity, and potentially implements inefficient outcomes.