Fund Managers, Career Concerns, and Asset Price Volatility
构建了一个基金经理职业关注模型，发现职业关注导致经理人投资决策扭曲，产生逆周期的声誉溢价，从而放大资产价格波动。
We propose a model of delegated portfolio management with career concerns. Investors hire fund managers to invest their capital either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have superior information on default risk. Based on past performance, investors update beliefs on managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns that affect managers' investment decisions, generating a countercyclical “reputational premium.” When default risk is high, return on bonds is high to compensate uninformed managers for the high risk of being fired. As default risk changes over time, the reputational premium amplifies price volatility.