National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly
分析工会如何影响国际寡头垄断中的并购模式及福利效应，发现企业倾向于国际并购，且国际并购数量通常超过社会最优水平，但扶持国内并购的“国家冠军”政策并非最优。
We analyze how the presence of trade unions affects the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. We find that wages for the merger participants are always lower when they merge internationally, rather than nationally. Using a model of endogenous merger formation, we find that the firms will merge internationally in equilibrium. There are more international mergers than socially preferred, unless products are close substitutes. A “national champion” policy of promoting domestic mergers rather than international ones is nevertheless never optimal .