Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices
研究发现，只有在非竞争性行业中，治理差的公司才表现出更低的股票收益、更差的经营业绩和更低的企业价值，且这些公司劳动效率更低、投入成本更高、并购更易破坏价值，并更可能成为激进对冲基金的目标。
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.