Stock Options and Total Payout
研究高管股票期权使用如何影响公司总支付，发现期权使用越高，总支付越低，且回购部分抵消稀释效应，但无股利保护期权的主导作用导致总支付下降。
Abstract In this paper, we examine how stock option usage affects total corporate payout. Using fixed-effects panel data estimators on various samples of ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2005, we find the higher the executive stock options, the lower the total payout, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that firms increase payouts through repurchases in order to offset earnings per share dilution that occurs due to usage of executive and non-executive stock options. However, incentives from not having dividend protection for options appear to dominate those from antidilution, resulting in lower total payout for firms with higher options usage.