Financial Contracting and Organizational Form: Evidence from the Regulation of Trade Credit
利用一项限制大型零售商与小型供应商之间贸易信贷期限的法规，研究发现该限制使交易可能性降低11%，并促使零售商将采购内部化至子公司，同时减少总采购量。关系合约可缓解无法提供长期贸易信贷的影响。
ABSTRACT We present evidence that restrictions to the set of feasible financial contracts affect buyer‐supplier relationships and the organizational form of the firm. We exploit a regulation that restricted the maturity of the trade credit contracts that a large retailer could sign with some of its small suppliers. Using a within‐product difference‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find that the restriction reduces the likelihood of trade by 11%. The retailer also responds by internalizing procurement to its own subsidiaries and reducing overall purchases. Finally, we find that relational contracts can mitigate the inability to extend long trade credit terms.