Efficient Pricing of Large Value Interbank Payment Systems
研究在银行未来支付量存在不可观测异质性时，大额支付系统的有效定价。发现公共垄断系统的最优定价包含递减边际费用的数量折扣；与低成本私营系统竞争时，公共系统的边际费用低于边际成本，需征收固定费用。
This paper studies the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity about banks' future payment volumes. It is shown that the optimal pricing scheme for a public monopoly system involves quantity discounts in the form of a decreasing marginal fee. This is also true when the public system competes with a provate system characterized by a lower marginal cost. However in this case, optimal marginal fees in the public system are lower than its marginal cost, and fixed fees have to be levied. We also study the case of competition between several public systems. The structure of the optimal tariff depends on the willigness of Central Banks to allow by-pass.