Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
通过一项让工人自由选择工作时间和每小时努力的田野实验，发现总体劳动力供给对工资的弹性为正且较大，但每小时努力的弹性为负，且只有损失厌恶的个体表现出负的努力响应。
Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant substitution effects. It is possible that these results are due to constraints on workers' labor supply choices. We conducted a field experiment in a setting in which workers were free to choose hours worked and effort per hour. We document a large positive elasticity of overall labor supply and an even larger elasticity of hours, which implies that the elasticity of effort per hour is negative. We examine two candidate models to explain these findings: a modified neoclassical model with preference spillovers across periods, and a model with reference dependent, loss-averse preferences. With the help of a further experiment, we can show that only loss-averse individuals exhibit a negative effort response to the wage increase.