Rumor Has It: Sensationalism in Financial Media
研究金融媒体发布耸动报道的动机如何影响并购谣言准确性，发现记者经验、专业教育和行业专长能预测准确性，而投资者未充分关注这些特征，导致股价过度反应后反转。
The media has an incentive to publish sensational news. We study how this incentive affects the accuracy of media coverage in the context of merger rumors. Using a novel dataset, we find that accuracy is predicted by a journalist's experience, specialized education, and industry expertise. Conversely, less accurate stories use ambiguous language and feature well-known firms with broad readership appeal. Investors do not fully account for the predictive power of these characteristics, leading to an initial target price overreaction and a subsequent reversal, consistent with limited attention. Overall, we provide novel evidence on the determinants of media accuracy and its effect on asset prices.