Competition for Flow and Short-Termism in Activism
构建双层代理模型研究激进基金为争夺投资者资金流而竞争，导致其通过提高杠杆增加短期分红，进而在经济下行时因债务积压阻碍价值创造干预，揭示了资产管理激励加剧经济脆弱性的新渠道。
Abstract We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds competing for investor flow. Competition for flow affects the manner in which activist funds govern as blockholders. In particular, funds inflate their short-term performance by increasing payouts that are financed by higher (net) leverage. Doing so subsequently discourages value-creating interventions during economic downturns because of debt overhang. Our theory suggests a new channel via which asset manager incentives may foster economic fragility and links together the observed procyclicality of activist investments with the documented effect of such funds on the leverage of their target companies. Received July 2, 2020; editorial decision August 8, 2020; Editor Uday Rajan.