Corrective Taxation versus Liability
比较税收和责任两种控制有害外部性的手段，解释为何责任更常用；税收因无法反映所有影响预期损害变量而低效，责任则只需评估实际损害，但责任因加害人逃避诉讼而激励稀释，应联合使用二者。
Taxation and liability are compared as means of controlling harmful externalities, with a view toward explaining why the use of liability predominates over taxation. Taxation suffers from a disadvantage in the analysis: because taxes do not reflect all the variables affecting expected harm, inefficiency results, whereas efficiency under liability requires only assessment of actual harm. However, liability also suffers from a disadvantage: incentives are diluted because injurers escape suit. Joint use of taxation and liability is examined, and it is shown that liability should be employed fully, with taxation taking up the slack due to escape from suit.