A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics*
构建了一个多期借贷关系模型，证明信息不对称导致最优长期贷款合同内生出融资约束，且约束随企业未来现金流价值增加而放松；模型预测企业年龄和规模增长时，增长均值和方差下降、生存率上升、投资对现金流的敏感性降低，与实证一致。
There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival.In this paper we model a multi-period borrowing/lending relationship with asymmetric information.We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower's claim to future cash-flows increases.We also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics.In agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and variance of growth decrease, firm survival increases, and the sensitivity of investment to cash-flows declines.