Moral Hazard in Reinsurance Markets
构建多期委托代理模型分析再保险交易，并用美国财产责任再保险面板数据验证，发现非关联方使用损失敏感保费而关联方更多依赖监控。
Abstract This article attempts to identify moral hazard in the traditional reinsurance market. We build a multiperiod principal–agent model of the reinsurance transaction from which we derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control, and insurer risk retention. We then use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance to test the model. The empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. In particular, we find evidence for the use of loss‐sensitive premiums when the insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates (i.e., not part of the same financial group), but little or no use of monitoring. In contrast, we find evidence for the extensive use of monitoring when the insurer and reinsurer are affiliates, where monitoring costs are lower.