原地奔跑:作为地位游戏的消费者选择

Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status

American Economic Review · 2004
被引 0
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究当消费者在意地位(即消费某种“地位商品”的排名)时,其消费选择具有策略性,导致在纳什均衡中过度消费地位商品;利用拍卖理论分析收入分配变化的影响,发现更富裕的社会中炫耀性消费增加而效用降低,更平等的社会中穷人境况更差。

Abstract

If individuals care about their status, defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one “positional” good, then the consumer's problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good. Using techniques from auction theory, we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income. In a richer society, almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption, and individual utility is lower at each income level. In a more equal society, the poor are worse off.

地位性消费炫耀性消费收入分配纳什均衡