Exchanges of Cost Information in the Airline Industry
用数据模拟了美国航空与联合航空在芝加哥奥黑尔机场的双头垄断市场，发现交换成本信息会让航空公司受益，但对消费者损害不大。
We empirically analyze exchanges of cost information in a multimarket oligopoly model for the airline industry with entry and incomplete information on marginal costs. We develop an algorithm to solve the Nash equilibrium numerically. We estimate the structural model of supply decisions using data on the American Airlines and United Airlines duopoly at Chicago O'Hare airport. Our results provide probabilities of entry, expected quantities, prices, and profits in each market. Given the estimated parameters, we simulate competition under a hypothetical agreement to exchange cost information. We find that such exchanges would benefit airlines while only moderately costing consumers. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)