HOW WELL DO MARKET TIMING, CATERING, AND CLASSICAL THEORIES EXPLAIN CORPORATE DECISIONS?
构建了一个衡量CEO持股未解释变动的指标，检验市场时机、迎合与经典理论对公司决策的解释力，发现经典理论得到支持，而迎合理论无实证支持，市场时机理论支持较弱。
An important debate in corporate finance is whether chief executive officers (CEOs) exploit equity mispricing. In this article I construct a measure of the unexplained change in the CEO's stockholdings of the firm to empirically test the contrasting predictions of market timing, catering, and classical theories of corporate decisions. Consistent with the predictions of classical theories, I find that the firm increases its investments and even uses expensive capital to finance investments when there is an unexplained increase in the CEO's stockholdings. However, I find no empirical support for catering predictions and weak empirical support for market timing predictions.