Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs
研究在竞赛前新人通过炫耀传递才能信号的动机，发现只有极优秀者才会炫耀，这反而节省双方精力，但反对炫耀的社会规范在注重选拔效率时会降低福利。
We analyze the incentives for showing off, which we model as a costly signaling game, and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest, a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium, costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results rationalize the emergence of norms against showing off in settings where total effort is important. When selection efficiency matters, such norms decrease welfare.