Liquidity and Shareholder Activism
研究发现股票流动性增加了股东积极主义的可能性，但对可能被高估的公司影响较小，因为知情的大股东更倾向于卖出而非干预。流动性通过允许积极主义者在行动前积累股票来克服搭便车问题。
Blockholders' incentives to intervene in corporate governance are weakened by free-rider problems and high costs of activism. Theory suggests activists may recoup expenses through informed trading of target firms' stock when stocks are liquid. We show that stock liquidity increases the probability of activism but does less so for potentially overvalued firms for which privately informed blockholders may have greater incentives to sell their stake than to intervene. We also document that activists accumulate more stocks in targets when stock is more liquid. We conclude that liquidity helps overcome the free-rider problem and induces activism via preactivism accumulation of target firms' shares.