Asset Markets and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points: An Experimental Study
实验研究了在更大群体中拍卖公共品博弈参与权如何影响均衡选择和公共品供给，发现拍卖显著提升供给但价格升至上限耗尽所有收益。
We report experimental results on the effects that auctioning the right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection and individual behavior. Auctioning off such a right among a larger population of players strikingly enhances public good provision. Once public good provision is obtained, the auction price at the preliminary stage increases to its upper limit, dissipating all players' gains associated with the provision of the public good. Individual deviations from the equilibrium strategy are neither able to force lower market prices nor to affect provision of the public good in subsequent periods.