The Effect of Board Independence on Information Asymmetry
研究了董事会独立性如何降低投资者之间的信息不对称，发现自愿性披露和分析师覆盖是两种作用机制，其中分析师覆盖的影响更显著。
Boards have an important role in ensuring that investors’ interests are protected. Our paper first examines whether the independence of a firm's board affects information asymmetry among investors. We provide evidence that greater board independence leads to lower information asymmetry. Next, we provide evidence that more voluntary disclosure and greater analyst coverage are two underlying mechanisms via which greater board independence reduces information asymmetry. Of the two mechanisms, we find that analyst coverage is more significant in influencing how board independence affects information asymmetry. Overall, our paper contributes to a better understanding of the effect of board independence on information asymmetry.