Optimal Bankruptcy Laws Across Different Economic Systems
通过模型分析不同经济体系下债权人获取信息能力与经理人策略性使用私人信息的差异，提出了针对银行主导型、市场主导型和欠发达经济体的最优破产法设计。
We model fundamental differences across economic systems and propose optimal bankruptcy laws. We show that creditor-debtor relationships in a given economy are affected by the ability of creditors to obtain information about fundamentals and the managers' ability to strategically use their private information. An optimal bankruptcy law utilizes creditors' information while minimizing managers' use of strategic information. Our proposed laws for a developed bank-based system like Germany include a creditor chapter only, for a developed market-based system like the United States include both a creditor chapter and a debtor chapter, and for an underdeveloped system include both a creditor chapter and a debtor chapter that gives the manager more protection than in a market-based system. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.