What’s behind Smooth Dividends? Evidence from Structural Estimation
通过构建动态代理模型，发现美国公司股利平滑行为中39%源于经理人职业担忧而非股东偏好，且这种平滑导致公司价值下降2%。
I study the driving forces behind dividend smoothing by developing a dynamic agency model in which dividends signal the earnings persistence of firms. In equilibrium, managers treat dividends and earnings as informational substitutes. They smooth dividends relative to earnings to smooth negative news releases and lower their turnover risk. Empirical estimates of the model parameters imply that 39$\%$ of observed dividend smoothness among U.S. firms is driven by managers’ own career concerns, not shareholders’ preferences. Managers cut investments and adjust external financing policies to accommodate this career-concern-based dividend smoothing. These effects lead to a 2$\%$ decline in firm value. Received May 28, 2016; editorial decision September 13, 2017 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.