The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea
研究韩国在亚洲金融危机后强制引入外部独立董事的规定，发现外部董事对企业绩效有显著正面影响，而财阀或家族控制的影响不显著或为负，说明外部董事的效果取决于董事会构成和市场环境。
Abstract This paper examines the valuation impacts of outside independent directors in Korea, where a regulation requiring outside directors was instituted after the Asian financial crisis. In contrast to studies of U.S. firms, the effects of independent directors on firm performance are strongly positive. Foreigners also have positive impacts. The effects of indigenous institutions such as chaebol or family control are insignificant or negative. This implies that the effect of outsiders depends on board composition as well as the nature of the market in which the firm operates.