VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND SHARED FACILITIES IN UNREGULATED INDUSTRIES
研究了自由化后涉及关键设施的行业均衡市场结构，分析了两种进入模式与垂直整合的关系，发现垂直整合是占优策略，且当进入者固定成本超过阈值时上游企业会选择共享现有设施。
In this paper we analyze the equilibrium market structure, following liberalization, of an industry involving an essential facility. Two alternative modes of market entry are considered, in conjunction with vertical integration, namely: (i) full entry, which means building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost; and (ii) partial entry, which means purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent, at a fixed price per unit that is freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant. We show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, and that upstream firms choose to share the incumbent's facility when the entrant's fixed cost exceeds a positive threshold. In addition, welfare analysis shows that in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade‐off between fixed‐cost savings and softened downstream competition, thus providing a rationale for the liberalization of such industries. Several competition policy implications are discussed.