From K Street to Wall Street: Political Connections and Stock Recommendations
研究卖方分析师是否通过政治关联获取有价值信息，发现政治关联券商的分析师推荐股票更赚钱，尤其在政治敏感股票上，且围绕《平价医疗法案》的分析进一步支持该结论。
ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether sell-side security analysts gain access to value-relevant information through political connections. We measure analysts' political connections based on political contributions at the brokerage-house level. We argue that if brokerages are able to obtain private information through their political connections, then analysts at politically connected brokerages should issue more profitable stock recommendations, and this increased profitability should be more pronounced for politically sensitive stocks. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions. Analyses of recommendations issued surrounding the Affordable Care Act further support our main inferences. Moreover, our findings hold after we employ numerous tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these results suggest that brokerages obtain value-relevant, nonpublic information from their political connections. JEL Classifications: G24; G38; G14.