Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods
研究了竞拍者具有私人价值、多单位需求和非拟线性偏好时的多单位拍卖设计，给出了保留维克里拍卖理想性质的机制条件，并证明了多维类型下无法同时满足这些性质和弱预算平衡。
I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non‐quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single‐dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multidimensional types.