Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment
通过实验室信贷市场实验，发现信息共享能提高还款率，因为借款人预期良好信用记录有助于获得信贷；但当借贷双方可重复互动时，信用报告的作用减弱，双边关系更能约束借款人。
How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.