Investor Heterogeneity, Investor-Management Disagreement and Share Repurchases
提出并检验了股票回购的新理论：当投资者与管理层对公司投资项目存在分歧时，回购可改变投资者构成，降低分歧，提升一致性。
This paper develops and tests a new theoretical explanation for stock repurchases. Investors may disagree with the manager about the firm's investment projects. A repurchase causes a change in the investor base as investors who are most likely to disagree with the manager tender their shares. Therefore, a firm is more likely to buy back shares when the level of investor-management agreement is lower, and agreement improves as a consequence. Moreover, dispersion of opinion among investors cannot explain repurchase activity once the stock price and investor-management agreement are controlled for. Overall, the evidence is consistent with firms strategically using repurchases to improve alignment between management and shareholders.