Estimating Strategic Models of International Treaty Formation
开发了一个实证框架，将国际条约形成建模为政府间动态博弈，利用批准日期数据估计战略互动的方向和大小，并应用于蒙特利尔议定书、欧洲优惠贸易协定和德国双边投资条约网络。
This article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties. Atreaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period.The net benefit of treaty membership increases over time. Spillovers among members and non-membersaccelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute,respectively. The predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters, based on across section of treaty ratification dates.With this approach, I estimate the sign and magnitude of strategicinteraction in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in the formation of Europe's preferential tradeagreements, and in the growth of Germany's network of bilateral investment treaties. Through a seriesof counterfactual experiments, I explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in theformation of these treaties.