ARE FIRM‐ AND COUNTRY‐SPECIFIC GOVERNANCE SUBSTITUTES? EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL CONTRACTS IN EMERGING MARKETS
研究了新兴市场中借款公司治理如何影响银行贷款合同条款，发现公司治理越强，贷款金额越大、期限越长、抵押要求越低、利差越小，且公司治理与国家治理在合同制定和执行中相互替代。
Abstract We investigate how borrowers’ corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country‐level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with respect to loan amount, maturity, collateral requirements, and spread. Firm‐level and country‐level corporate governance are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. We also find that the distinctiveness of borrowers’ characteristics affect the relation between firm‐level corporate governance and loan contracting terms. Our findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and specifications.