Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
通过实验室实验研究重复锦标赛中的破坏行为，发现工资差距越大，努力和破坏行为越多；明确称呼“破坏”可减少破坏行为，而沟通能抑制破坏并促进扁平化奖励结构。
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations, reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior are almost nonexistent. We study sabotage in repeated tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and observe that effort and sabotage are higher for higher wage spreads. Additionally, we find that also in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages by exerting higher effort. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name “sabotage.” Communication among principal and agents can curb sabotage when they agree on flat prize structures and increased output. If sabotage is not possible, the principals choose tournament incentives more often. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.