次贷危机与董事会(不)胜任能力:德国私有银行与国有银行的比较

Subprime crisis and board (in-) competence: private versus public banks in Germany

Economic Policy · 2009
被引 159
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

研究德国国有银行在金融危机中表现不佳是否源于董事会质量,通过分析29家最大银行592名监事会成员的背景,发现私有与国有银行在金融和管理经验上存在显著差异,且董事会金融能力与损失相关。

Abstract

We examine evidence for a systematic underperformance of Germany’s state-owned banks in the current financial crisis and study if the bank losses can be traced to the quality of bank governance. For this purpose, we examine the biographical background of 592 supervisory board members in the 29 largest banks and find a pronounced difference in the finance and management experience of board representatives across private and state-owned banks. Measures of ‘boardroom competence’ are then related directly to the magnitude of bank losses in the recent financial crisis. Our data confirm that supervisory board (in-)competence in finance is related to losses in the financial crisis. Improved bank governance is therefore a suitable policy objective to reduce bank fragility.— Harald Hau and Marcel Thum

次贷危机银行治理董事会能力国有银行