Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies
提出一个理论模型，解释在信息不对称和道德风险下，金融信息收集机构（如评级机构）的形成原因：既能分散风险，又能实现信息共享，但仅分散风险不足以解释其存在。
We propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. In a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of information gathering agencies (groups of screening agents) is justified on two grounds. First, it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs. Second, it allows information sharing. The first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them.