Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
通过实验研究，发现当家庭只能提交有限数量的学校偏好时，更多参与者会操纵偏好，加入保底学校是主要操纵方式，且限制选择加剧了隔离，降低了分配稳定性和效率。
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferences. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy