Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs
研究发现，关联方交易总量与股东财富无显著关联，但事前交易（交易后对方才成为关联方）无害甚至有益，而事后交易（对方成为关联方后发起的交易）则损害盈利能力、导致股价下跌并增加财务困境风险。
ABSTRACT Related party transactions (RPTs) are potential means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders via self‐dealing. There are, however, possible benefits to these arrangements for outside shareholders. We find that the overall volume of disclosed RPTs is generally not significantly associated with shareholder wealth as measured by operating profitability or Tobin's Q. However, the results for total RPT volume obscure that ex ante RPTs, transactions that predate a counterparty becoming a related party, are innocuous at worst in terms of their association with operating profitability and significantly positively associated with Tobin's Q whereas ex post RPTs, transactions initiated after a counterparty becomes a related party, are significantly negatively associated with operating profitability. Ex post RPTs also result in significant share price declines when first disclosed and are associated with an increased likelihood that a firm will enter financial distress or deregister its securities. These results are consistent with ex post RPTs serving as means for insiders to expropriate outside shareholders.