The Reluctant Analyst
研究了金融分析师推荐建议的惯性，发现分析师不情愿频繁修改推荐，其策略性推荐旨在从散户交易中获利，且投资者重视其中揭示的私人信息。
ABSTRACT We estimate the dynamics of recommendations by financial analysts, uncovering the determinants of inertia in their recommendations. We provide overwhelming evidence that analysts revise recommendations reluctantly, introducing frictions to avoid frequent revisions. More generally, we characterize the sources underlying the infrequent revisions that analysts make. Publicly available data matter far less for explaining recommendation dynamics than do the recommendation frictions and the long‐lived information that analysts acquire but the econometrician does not observe. Estimates suggest that analysts structure recommendations strategically to generate a profitable order flow from retail traders. We provide extensive evidence that our model describes how investors believe analysts make recommendations, and that investors value private information revealed by analysts' recommendations.