Investments and Network Competition
分析双向接入费如何影响企业投资不同质量网络的激励，发现即使对称模型和两部定价下也会出现“默契合谋”，企业倾向于低质量投资，且高于成本的互惠结算费会加剧这一现象。
This paper analyzes the impact of two-way access charges on the incentives to invest in networks with different levels of quality. When quality has an impact on all calls initiated by customers (destined both on-net and off-net), we obtain a result of "tacit collusion" even in a symmetric model with two-part pricing. Firms tend to under-invest in quality, and this is exacerbated if they can negotiate reciprocal termination charges above cost. When the quality of off-net calls depends on the interaction between the quality of the two networks, no network has an incentive to jump ahead of its rival by investing more.