Competition in Treasury Auctions
研究了奥地利加入欧盟后，参与国债拍卖的银行数量增加如何影响拍卖结果，发现竞标者剩余大幅下降，但降幅小于简化估计的结果，因为简化估计未考虑加入欧盟后估值的上升。
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria’s EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders’ private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders’ surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.