Contracting among Founders
研究了新公司创始人之间何时签订契约、如何设计最优契约，以及这对团队形成、所有权、激励和绩效的影响，发现延迟契约在创始人技能不确定时更有利，而股权归属条款可缓解团队形成中的低效。
This article develops a theory of contracting among founders of a new firm. It asks at what stage founders agree to commit to each other, how they structure optimal founder contracts, and how this affects team formation, ownership, incentives, and performance. The article derives a trade-off between upfront contracting, which can result in teams with ineffective founders, versus delayed contracting, which can enable some founders to appropriate ideas and start their own firms. Delayed contracting becomes more attractive when there are significant doubts about the skills of founders. We show that contingent contracts with vesting of shares may be used to mitigate inefficiencies in the team formation process. We also show that laws that provide protection to implied partnerships may have the unintended effect of encouraging more formal contracting.