Bidding and Information: Evidence from Gilt‐edged Auctions
通过比较拍卖价格与二级市场几乎相同的母债券价格，发现政府债务拍卖仅在非可互换拍卖中存在显著的低定价现象，为理解拍卖机制提供了更干净的度量。
Many studies have shown that government debt auctions underprice debt compared with the secondary market. This paper corroborates this for certain forms of gilt auction by comparing the price received at auction with an almost identical parent stock in the secondary market. Although the sample is small, the parent/auction stock price comparison gives a cleaner measure than used in other studies. The paper also compares non-fungible auctions (where the auction stock differs slightly from the parent at auction and merges subsequently) with fully-fungible ones (where they are identical throughout). Significant underpricing only occurs in non-fungible auctions.