Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
分析在公共物品博弈中，信息披露如何影响搭便车行为及合作崩溃的可能性，发现更多披露可能降低预期捐赠，并探讨了披露成本增加反而可能提高公共物品供给和福利的条件。
This article analyzes the effect of information generation and disclosure upon free-riding and on the likelihood that cooperative efforts collapse in a public-goods game. In this model, the prospect of greater disclosure can make all individuals worse off ex ante by reducing expected contributions to the public good. The model provides conditions under which disclosure becomes either more or less desirable as a function of the number of individual contributors. Regulation or competitive problems that increase direct costs of disclosure may on average increase the provision of public goods and improve welfare. The desirability of disclosure in the contexts of collective political action, debt renegotiation, and production in teams are discussed.