Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership
研究了流动性受限且私下观察成本的代理人如何与委托人签订无限期经营合同，最优激励方案类似血汗股权合同，代理人成为所有者后才开始获得报酬并实现高效生产，解释了现实中的工作转所有权特许经营和风险投资合同。
We study a setting in which a principal contracts with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and privately observes the sequence of cost realizations. We formulate the principal’s problem as a dynamic program in which the state variable is the agent’s continuation utility, which is naturally interpreted as his equity in the firm. The optimal incentive scheme resembles what is commonly regarded as a sweat equity contract, with all rents back loaded. Payments begin when the agent effectively becomes the owner, and from this point on, all production is efficient. These features are shown to be similar to features common in real‐world work‐to‐own franchising agreements and venture capital contracts.