Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment
构建了一个可解析的模型，将动态投资理论与动态最优激励契约结合，内生融资约束，发现激励契约导致边际q与平均q之间存在历史依赖的缺口，财务松弛而非现金流是融资约束的合适代理变量。
ABSTRACT We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history‐dependent wedge between marginal and average q , and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time‐invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.