Market Forces and CEO Pay: Shocks to CEO Demand Induced by IPO Waves
构建竞争均衡模型，发现行业IPO浪潮加剧了对CEO的竞争，使薪酬-规模弹性提高6%，且该效应在专业化行业中更强，表明市场力量决定CEO薪酬。
I develop a simple competitive equilibrium model and derive the prediction that CEO pay-size elasticity increases when more firms compete for an inelastic supply of managers. Using industry-level IPO waves as a proxy for increased competition for CEOs, I find that pay-size elasticity increases by 6% with a one-standard-deviation increase in IPO activity. This effect is stronger in specialized industries. In addition, increased IPO activity leads to a greater likelihood of executive transitions between firms. These findings indicate that market forces play a key role in the determination of CEO pay.Received August 6, 2015; editorial decision September 24, 2016 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.