Governance and Merger Accounting: Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to Purchase versus Pooling
研究了公司治理如何影响投资者对并购会计方法选择的反应，发现市场对购买法有正面反应，而对权益结合法有负面反应，且治理薄弱时反应更强烈。
Abstract This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on investor reactions to accounting choice in the context of accounting for business combinations. Using a sample of 324 recent stock swap acquisitions I find that, contrary to practitioners' belief that capital markets penalize purchase accounting, the opposite appears to be true; there is a negative and significant differential market reaction of approximately 4% for acquiring firms that announce pooling transactions. This return differential declines to negative 8% for firms with ineffective corporate governance. These findings are consistent with capital markets interpreting the choice of purchase accounting as a signal of management's confidence in the likelihood of a successful merger. This signal is particularly relevant when corporate governance is considered ineffective.