Incenting managers toward the triple bottom line: An agency and social norm perspective
通过实验研究直接和间接薪酬激励对中层管理者在环境可持续项目与成本节约项目之间投资决策的影响，发现同等激励下可持续投资显著更低，仅当可持续激励更优时才可比，并揭示社会规范差异和间接激励低估的作用。
Abstract Research to date has identified CEO pay structure as an important factor in the environmental and social performance of the organization but has not considered how pay may influence these sustainability efforts at the middle‐management level. We address this void with an experimental manipulation of direct and indirect pay incentives for an environmental sustainability project and production cost savings project. Counter to our predictions, investment in sustainability versus cost savings is significantly lower when incentives for both projects are equivalent, and investment is only comparable when incentives for the sustainability project are superior. Further investigation using qualitative data attributes this to differences in the salient social norms that individuals hold and an apparent undervaluing of the indirect incentive derived through sustainability's contribution to cost savings. The results shed light on primary ways in which human resource management practices may be used to embed support for sustainability initiatives throughout the organization.