The dark side of shareholder litigation: Evidence from corporate takeovers
利用美国23个州在1989-2005年间逐步采纳通用需求法（使股东派生诉讼更难提起）的自然实验，研究发现诉讼威胁降低后，收购方在并购中获得了更高的公告回报和更好的并购后经营业绩，表明诉讼风险会扭曲管理者激励并事前破坏价值。
Abstract Exploiting staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws by 23 states between 1989 and 2005 that makes filing shareholder derivative litigations more difficult, we show that reduced litigation threats improve corporate takeover efficiency. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that acquirers experience higher announcement returns and better postmerger operating performance after the UD laws. Further analysis suggests that acquirers make suboptimal merger decisions to avoid litigation. Taken together, we show that litigation risk can distort managers’ incentives and destroy value ex ante.