Risk Management Failures
将风险管理建模为延迟交易决策的信息获取行为，发现在抢先竞争的市场中，优先执行交易而非风险管理对每个企业最优但整体效率低下，导致风险错配随交易速度和规模上升。
Abstract We model risk management as information acquisition that delays trading decisions. In markets with preemptive competition, this can lead to a race to the bottom, where prioritizing trade execution over risk management is optimal for each firm, but collectively inefficient. As time competition intensifies, mean trading profit supplants risk concerns as the main driver of risk management quality, causing risk misallocation to rise with trading speed and volume. This pathology of risk management failure—the trio of time-consuming risk assessment, preemptive competition, and boom markets—has distinctive regulatory implications. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.